Using panel data from the US states, we document a robust negative relationship between state-level government corruption and ideological polarization. This finding is sustained when state polarization is instrumented using lagged state neighbor ideology. We argue that polarization enhances political accountability. Consistent with this thesis federal prosecutorial e ort falls and case quality increases with polarization. The e ect of polarization is dampened when there are other means of monitoring governments in particular strong media coverage of state politics. Tangible anti-corruption measures including the stringency of state ethics' laws and independent commissions for redistricting are also associated with increased state polarization.
"The one thing that gnaws on me is the degree of continued polarization." President Barack Obama -01/24/16
Introduction
Democracy, unfortunately, does not eliminate corruption. In international data Treisman (2000) finds it to be a rather weak constraint and Persson et al (2003) note that corruption, to varying extents, persists in mature democracies. Using cross-country data, Testa (2010) and Brown et al (2011) uncover the intriguing regularity that corruption falls with political polarization in democracies. This finding is intriguing because generally polarization is bemoaned in the political-economic literature as well as in public discourse, as illustrated by the above quote from the previous U.S. President. 1
In theory polarization, defined as the ideological distance between parties, a ects the incentives and opportunities for public o cials to misuse their o ce for private gain. Following the evidence found in the cross-country setting the argument of this paper is that accountability increases. Ideological distance between parties increases the ideological consequences of government replacement (Testa, 2012) , potentially reduces the likelihood that parties collude in rent-seeking activities, or similarly strengthens the opposition's incentives to monitor the corruption of incumbents, as hypothesized in Brown et al (2011) . This paper tests the hypothesis that party polarization reduces corruption using panel data from the United States. 2 This testbed o ers several advantages over the international setting. Firstly, as Besley and Case (2003) observe, the common broad institutional and constitutional setting rules out many sources of unobserved heterogeneity, a major concern in the international context. Secondly, the data are considerably more extensive across time, covering the 48 contiguous states for the period 1976-2004 . This permits using fixed (state) e ects in the econometric analysis, hence time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Third, as detailed below, the corruption data -taken from actual federal corruption convictions -are better measured than the corruption perceptions data used at the international level. Fourth, the data measuring political polarization are also superior, depending on actual voting behavior of elected representatives within a particular institutional framework.
We argue for causal inference by developing an instrumental variable (IV) for 1 The literature identifies adverse consequences, for instance, for policy e ciency (Schultz 2008; Azzimonti and Talbert 2014) and private investment (Azzimonti 2011) .
2 The substantial quantitative literature looking at corruption across the US states has pointed to various factors ranging from cultural diversity to political competition and divided government (Glaeser and Saks 2006; Lassen 2003, 2008) , but it has not as yet investigated the e ect of ideological polarization.
state-level ideological polarization at a particular point in time. As discussed below, there is broad evidence that both individual political attitudes and policy choices di use slowly across geographic space, from neighbor to neighbor and from state to state. Taking inspiration from this evidence we conjecture that liberal shifts in neighboring state average Democrat ideology, and conservative shifts in neighboring state Republican ideology, exogenously cause own-state polarization to increase with a lag. The data support this conjecture especially in the case of the Democrats.
Under the identifying assumption that lagged political platforms in neighboring states are exogenous, the instrumental variable regression output can be understood to represent estimates of a causal relationship from polarization to corruption. 3
The consistent finding is that lower corruption coexists with increased polarization. The estimated e ect is sizeable. For example if states such as Oregon or New
Hampshire (with polarization levels around the mean) were as polarized as California (on average the most polarized state), corruption would totally disappear in these states. The result holds using both OLS and instrumental variables estimation and in both panel and cross-sectional data.
We extend the empirical analysis in three di erent directions. Firstly we examine whether the federal allocation of prosecutorial resources is related to state level polarization, and document, novelly, a (somewhat weak) negative relationship in the data.
State-level corruption convictions depend on prosecutorial e ort and Alt and Lassen (2014) find some evidence that such resources are in part politically determined, although they do not investigate its relationship with polarization. Nonetheless there is a possibility that prosecutorial e ort strategically falls with polarization, in turn explaining the documented negative correlation between corruption convictions and polarization.
However if polarization serves to increase political accountability, as argued in this paper, then actual corruption will fall, and with it case referrals. Here the rational response at the federal level is to reduce prosecutorial resources. Hence there are potentially two alternative mechanisms that can account for the negative relationship between prosecutorial resources and polarization. Nonetheless under strategic prosecution, one would expect asymmetry in the results depending on whether or not state-level incumbent politicians are aligned with the President. Prosecutorial e ort is hypothesized to be especially reduced with polarization under alignment, whilst it is hypothesized to increase with polarization when state-incumbents are not aligned with the President. We find no discernible di erence in the relationship between prosecutorial resources and polarization across subsamples where the State Governor is aligned with and opposed to the President and therefore conclude that the evidence is only consistent with the accountability thesis.
Relatedly, case-quality data taken from Gordon (2009) permits further comparison of strategic prosecution and accountability as competing explanations for the main finding. Gordon (2009) finds that the average case-quality, measured by subsequent punishment, for allies of the President is higher than that for the President's political opponents. Strategically prosecutors turn a 'blind eye' to marginal corruption acts by allies. We document, again novelly, that case quality also increases with polarization, but comparably for both defendants politically aligned with the President and also for those without political a liation. This suggests that strategic considerations are not the only driver of the relationship between case-quality and polarization. Moreover the evidence is consistent with our auxiliary hypothesis that greater polarization raises the expected costs of engaging in corruption, essentially the substance of increased accountability. When accountability is higher only high-level corruption with higher potential rewards to those committing it is rationalizable and hence case quality rises.
A second extension of the empirical work, building on Campante and Do (2014) , explores how the relationship between corruption and polarization changes depending on the capacity of state media to act as an alternative force for improving politician behavior. We find that under greater media coverage of state politics, the extent to which polarization is associated with lower corruption is dampened considerably. When the media is at its most e ective, the relationship between corruption and polarization almost disappears. When the media is measured as ine ective, then polarization is especially potent at reducing corruption. Again this is consistent with the accountability thesis. The extent to which polarization acts to improve politician behavior is reduced when alternative means of policing exists.
Finally the third extension investigates how tangible anti-corruption measures, as proposed and passed by state-level politicians, are related to corruption. Again consistent with the thesis that polarization serves to improve politician behavior we find that both the adoption likelihood and stringency of ethics laws are observed to increase with polarization. Similarly, more polarized states are also found to be more likely to adopt a politically independent commission for the redistricting process for state legislative districts, with the implication of reduced gerrymandering. In support of the accountability thesis policies that are widely recognized as e ective at reducing corruption are thus increasingly enacted with state polarization.
The next section develops a theoretical discussion of how polarization a ects corruption. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy.
Section 5 presents the main results and the robustness checks. Section 6 examines the relationship between polarization and the allocation of federal prosecutorial resources. Section 7 investigates how the results vary with the e ectiveness of the state media, and also how tangible anti-corruption measures change with polariza-tion. Section 8 o ers concluding remarks.
Theoretical Mechanisms
The literature suggests several avenues through which ideological polarization, defined as the ideological distance between candidates or parties, can a ect the level of corrupt activity. Testa (2010 and proposes that incumbents will reduce corruption with increased polarization because of a sharpened trade-o between current rent extraction and future policy. In this analysis incumbents care about future ideological policy and whilst corruption brings private benefits it also harms electoral prospects. The costs of election loss increase with greater ideological distance as the successor implements a platform far from the incumbent's preferences. Ideological polarization therefore helps to keep elected politicians accountable, lowering corruption.
Another possibility, advanced by Brown et al (2011) , is that the capacity to collude in corruption is facilitated when parties are ideologically proximate. The likelihood of government coalition plausibly increases with ideological proximity (Laver and Schofield 1998) . Parties may operate formally or informally in coalition, or similarly parties may anticipate greater likelihood of future coalition given ideological proximity. Given that rent-seeking opportunities are concentrated in the hands of incumbents, there is greater facility to collude, or for opposition politicians to turn a blind eye to incumbent corruption, when they are implementing ideologically consensual policy. Ideological proximity thus weakens the constraints on corruption. 4
These mechanisms can both be characterized as situations where government o cials consider the costs and benefits of engaging in corruption. In Testa (2010 and , for a given probability of being detected and consequent loss of electoral support, the ideological costs of election loss are raised. In Brown et al (2011) one might think of detection probability being raised when opposition politicians are ideologically distant. In both cases the expected costs of corruption increase.
As a consequence, as well as reducing the total amount of corruption, polarization should be especially potent at the margin: low-level corruption will no longer be rationalizable, whilst high-level corruption with potentially higher rewards may still be feasible. Case quality, as measured by sentencing severity, might therefore increase with polarization all else equal. Below we use data from Gordon (2009) to investigate this auxiliary hypothesis.
Brown et al (2011) also document mechanisms through which polarization may 4 Elmelund-Praestekaer (2010) provides evidence related to this mechanism if we consider "negative campaigning" as a particular case of monitoring of the incumbent. He finds that opposition parties with large proportions of party identifiers (i.e. who are partisan and ideologically distinct) in their membership are more likely to use negative campaigning, i.e. factual (or rhetorical) attacks against other parties, using data from Danish election campaigns.
instead increase corruption. Suppose that candidates compete on both "position issues" (ideology) over which the distribution of voter preferences is defined on a left-right axis and "valence issues" as those candidate characteristics that all voters value in the same way (such as being against corruption) (Stokes 1963 The thesis of this paper is that polarization increases accountability. Following Brown et al (2011) and Testa (2010) politicians are more inclined to police both themselves and their opposition when ideologies are polarized. Conversely when polarization is low there is reduced political discipline. Potentially low polarization places greater weight on the capacity of alternative means through which politicians may be held to account. One such alternative is presented by the media. 6 In principle the presence of a strong and objective media would reduce political corruption all else equal. However when polarization is high, if the accountability thesis is correct then politicians will more e ectively police each other, and hence in these circumstances the media may not be so necessary. But when polarization is low then a strong media presence is potentially more important as a constraint on corruption. These considerations lead to a further hypothesis: the cleansing e ect of polarization on corruption will be reduced when there is a strong media presence.
Data

Corruption Convictions
State-level corruption in a given year is measured as the number of federal convictions for corruption-related crime normalized by state population (following amongst others Glaeser and Saks 2006) . Corruption is defined as 'criminal abuses of public trust by government o cials' and convictions data are reported annually by the Public Integrity Section of the US Department of Justice.
5 Curini and Martelli (2010) provide related evidence that the ideological distance between the Communist Party (DCI/PDS) and the government in post-war Italy reduced the emphasis placed by that party on political corruption issues during the government investiture debates. 6 The interaction between the media environment and the incentives of public o cials have also been studied in the case of US (Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Lim, Snyder and Strömberg 2014 As noted by Glaeser and Saks (2006) these data have a number of advantageous properties for use in testing theories of corruption. First, the data correspond to actual convictions. This contrasts with cross-national studies such as Testa (2012) and Brown et al (2011) There are a small number of missing observations in the convictions data. For these cases linear interpolation is used in order to maximize the size of the dataset. This represents less than 7% of state-party-year observations. To estimate what the "mean ideology" score for these delegations would have been in these years, Berry et al (2010) used a regressionbased method, relying on the ideology of the other party, as well as the ideology of the same party in similar states (based on geographic proximity as well as similarity in political culture). A more detailed explanation can be found in Berry et al (1998) . 9 According to Berry et al (2010) , a major advantage of this version of their government ideology measure is that the ideal points of the Congress members are comparable from one session to the next and between the House and the Senate, as opposed to their earlier measures based on interest-group ratings (Berry et al 1998) . 10 In the wake of World War II two dimensions were required: (1) the liberal-conservative dimension related to the role of government in the economy and (2) the conflict over race and civil rights. However, with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1967 Open Housing Act, (all of which pre-date the sample period under investigation,) the second dimension declined in importance and race related issues -a rmative action, welfare, Medicaid, etc. -became questions of redistribution and thus became part of the liberal-conservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) . the Republican party and the Democrat party, corresponding to the polarization measure used in Garand (2010) . Thus polarization (P OL) within a particular stateyear is measured as:
Ideological Polarization
This series exhibits interesting variation across time and space. Figure 1 depicts average polarization across time. In the early part of the sample both parties are measured to be moving rightwards, hence average polarization is somewhat static prior to the 1980s, since when it has markedly increased.
The mean value for P OL is 33.38 and its standard deviation is 8. Whilst the data and specification both represent considerable improvements over cross-country studies, straightforward panel estimation using contemporaneous data would not by itself establish watertight causality from polarization to corruption.
Polarization has its own driving forces, which problematically also may independently drive corruption. The analysis goes some distance towards addressing this by controlling for the main candidate explanations for polarization in the US, in particular income inequality (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006) , fixed state and year e ects and a broad set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Our specification also controls for alternative mechanisms that could account for a negative empirical relationship between corruption and polarization. For example Lindqvist and Östling (2010) find that ideological polarization is associated with lower public spending in international data. Smaller government, in turn, arguably reduces the opportunity to divert funds. Our specification addresses this as the size of the state government is included as a control. Other alternative mechanisms are discussed in the robustness checks.
Moreover because in reality there are substantial lags between the time when a particular corrupt act is committed and when its perpetrator is convicted, in the regression analysis, polarization as well as the other independent variables are 11 The source of these detailed data is described in Alt and Lassen (2014) measured with a 5-year lag. This lag length corresponds to the average of the actual cases that we examined and for which information were available. 12 Taking a 5-year lag of the data helps to lessen concerns about endogeneity; the polarization measures now substantially predate the observations on corruption.
IV Strategy
In order to isolate exogenous movements in the state ideological polarization the analysis also employs an instrumental variable strategy. State polarization is instrumented with past political position-taking in geographically neighboring states. The idea is that when the Democrat parties of the neighboring states (weighted by population) move left, then the state Democrat position moves to the left with a lag, and polarization exogenously increases. Similarly, state polarization exogenously increases with a lag if the neighboring Republicans move right.
This strategy is based on an extensive literature in political science studying processes of policy and preference di usion across the US states and internationally. This literature provides widespread empirical evidence that particular states are more likely to adopt particular laws or policies if its neighboring states have already done so. Regional di usion of policy is documented in Berry and Berry (1990) and Mooney (2001) . Seljan and Weller (2011) find that proposals to limit state tax and expenditure are strongly determined by policy in proximate states. Note that these policies typically enter the categories of 'economic' and 'social' issues congruent with the liberal-conservative axis of the NOMINATE scores. Mooney (2001) and Boehmke and Witmer (2004) find that policy di usion is due to a social learning mechanism. A social learning process also underpins the di usion of ideology between states. The credibility of the IV strategy is revisited below, but there is strong evidence that ideas and ideology transmit geographically.
This reasoning yields two instruments: the 5-year lagged weighted average ide- problem' is addressed below. Column (3) contains estimation results using this small-state subsample. In support of the identification strategy susceptibility to neighboring ideology turns out to be stronger in small states.
Some states might have a small population, but still be immune to neighbors who may also have small populations. For instance in 2014, Maine is one the least populous states, ranking 40th in terms of state population. However it also has little in the way of neighbors. Defining 'relative population' as own-population divided by neighboring population (the sum of all the neighboring states), then Maine ranks 6th. Column (4) reports the estimation for a subsample excluding the 8 biggest states in terms of relative population. In line with the di usion hypothesis at the 14 A concern here is that dropping citizens' ideology from the second stage could entail an omitted variable bias if this directly a ects corruption. We are confident that such is not the case because when including it in the second stage, citizens' ideology is never found to be a significant determinant of corruption.
heart of our identification strategy, the influence of neighboring ideology is again enhanced in this subsample. demonstrating that the e ect of the neighbors survives, suggesting an influence of the past neighboring ideology independent of the past own-state ideology. Hence we infer that the correlation found is not symptomatic of reflection.
Polarization and Corruption
Panel Estimation
The raw correlation of the average corruption and polarization measures in Figure   1 , is 0.44. Taken at face value, this is in line with prior arguments that polarization is associated with adverse policy consequences. Note however that Figure 2 presents a negative correlation between individual state-averages of normalized corruption and ideological polarization. These basic data descriptives underline the need for a more concrete econometric analysis.
We therefore turn to panel data analysis drawing on the specification used in Alt and Lassen (2014) for the observation period 1976-2004. Results from applying OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered at the state level are presented in Table 2 . Column (1) presents results of a specification including state fixed e ects but without time e ects and controls, using annual data. In this specification the estimated coe cient of ideological polarization is negative, though not statistically significant. However, when augmenting this specification with year fixed e ects (column 2) or indeed just including the set of (time-varying) controls described above (column 3), the estimated coe cient on polarization increases in magnitude and becomes significant at the 5% level. Thus the positive raw correlation observed in 15 If Yt and Xt are both correlated, and also both strongly persistent and the true Data-Generating Process is that Xt≠1 causes Yt, it will also be the case that Yt≠1 and Xt are statistically correlated.
Figure 1, reflecting the upward co-movement in the two series, is an artefact of other temporal factors. Column (4) contains results including both state and year fixed e ects as well as the controls, hence corresponds to our benchmark specification.
The estimated coe cient of polarization is negative and significant at the 5% level. ***Insert Table 2*** Column (5) presents results employing the same specification as column (4) but using 3-year moving averages for the dependent variable (from t-2 to t) (as in Alt and Lassen (2014) This finding is robust to controlling for various political covariates potentially correlated with polarization which could separately influence corruption. Firstly high polarization measures could reflect a situation where one party has a large majority and the opposition is composed of a small number of extremist representatives. Thus the baseline specification is augmented with the share of democrats in the lower and upper state houses. Second, polarization may be related to political competition, hence we also include political competition data as used in Besley et al (2010) . Furthermore, governors facing finite term limits and not eligible for reelection may act di erentially hence a dummy variable for whether the governor is facing a term limit is also included. 16 Column (6) of Table 2 shows that including these controls has no quantitative e ect on the estimated impact of polarization. The exclusion restriction would be violated if ideology and tolerance of corruption were correlated. Nonetheless column (5) includes the 5-year lagged weighted average corruption of the neighboring states (weighted by population as for the instrument).
The results show that state-level corruption is una ected by the past corruption of neighboring states, which gives further support to the exclusion restriction.
Robustness: OLS Cross-Sectional Estimation
This sub-section presents results using cross-sectional data, allowing comparability with Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Campante and Do (2014) , and also facilitating robustness checks using alternative polarization and corruption measures. It also acts as the foundation for the analysis below of how accountability is tempered in the presence of a strong media, and of the channels through which accountability may be enhanced by polarization. The basic specification follows Glaeser and Saks (2006) . 17 ***Insert Column (3) instead uses a measure of state mass polarization using data from Garand (2010) . 19 This time the estimated coe cient is still negative but is now far from being statistically significant. Taken at face value, this suggests that the negative relationship between corruption and polarization is due to 'supply side' factors related to parties' positions and not 'demand side' explanations related to voters' preferences. This is consistent with the theoretical mechanisms discussed above, which focus on accountability increasing with the ideological distance between parties rather than voters.
The estimation results are also robust to alternative corruption measures. In column (4), following Maxwell and Winters (2004) The theoretical discussion is suggestive that polarization reduces corruption committed by elected politicians in particular. and also on defendants with an identifiable partisan orientation potentially including private citizens. Focusing on the smaller sample of government o cials with an identifiable partisan orientation displays a negative correlation coe cient, significant at even 5%. These data therefore are somewhat supportive of the hypothesis that polarization curbs the corruption of elected politicians in particular.
Robustness: 2SLS Cross-Sectional Estimation
This subsection further explores the risk of reverse causality between corruption and polarization. It analyzes directly the hypothesis that, facing corrupt governments, voters may disengage from politics and become less ideological and thus less polarized, which could account for the negative association between polarization and corruption. 23 We investigate the potential causal e ect of corruption convictions on polarization using cross-sectional data, employing OLS and also using the degree of isolation of the state capital city as an instrument for state corruption as in Campante and Do (2014) . The idea is that when the capital is more isolated, state government at large is perceived to be corrupt. Thus one of the jobs of elected politicians is to police corruption. Increased political polarization could induce stronger anti-corruption e orts given the greater ideological costs of electoral loss. 23 Richardson (2012) provides evidence that higher U.S. state rates of Federal corruption convictions were associated with significantly less citizen participation in activities associated with the campaigns and elections of 2008 and 2010. Olsson (2014) also documents a negative e ect of perception of corruption on political participation using international data.
o cials are less accountable and thus more corrupt.
The results are reported in However when state corruption is instrumented with the Campante and Do (2014) capital isolation measure, 2SLS regressions show that the association is not statistically significant anymore (columns 2 and 4). 24 This undermines the hypothesis of causality running from corruption to polarization and thus suggests that the significant relationship found in OLS is driven by the causal e ect of polarization on corruption. In the instance of Garand's measure of mass polarization (columns 5-6), neither the OLS nor the 2SLS estimation results find that it is statistically related to corruption, again suggesting that polarization in voter ideologies is not materially a ected by corruption. ***Insert Table 5*** A possible concern with the IV strategy employed in Table 5 could be violation of the exclusion restriction if capital isolation somehow directly a ects state polarization. To investigate this, columns (1), (3) and (5) in Tables A.2 
and A.3 in
Appendix report the reduced-form estimated e ect of capital isolation on the three di erent polarization measures used in Table 4 . In the corresponding columns (2), (4) and (6), we check if the reduced-form e ect survives the inclusion of the mediator variable, i.e. corruption convictions. Table A .2 includes the set of controls while Table A 
Polarization and Federal Prosecution
Corruption convictions are the outcome of prosecutorial e ort, and the literature identifies this as endogenous in its own right. Federal attorneys are appointed by the President, and thus may reflect a partisan political agenda. 25 Alt and Lassen (2014) found that under Republican Presidents prosecutorial resources are disproportionally allocated in states with smaller numbers of self-identified conservative voters. Gordon (2009) finds partisan bias manifest in an increased tendency to pursue weaker cases against opposition politicians. In broad terms in these analyses prosecution is somewhat strategic.
Prosecutorial Resources
As Alt and Lassen (2014) observe the initial step in any prosecution is case referral to the US Attorney's o ce, usually by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).
Following this the Attorney General decides whether to pursue full prosecution. The capacity of the FBI to build a case will depend on the availability of information 'on the ground', which in turn will depend on the considerations outlined in the theoretical arguments made above. For example opposition politicians may be more likely or able to provide useful information to the FBI when incumbents are more ideologically distant. Under conditions characterized by 'system capacity' such a mechanism would imply that polarization would increase the number of referrals and thus convictions. However, given 'deterrence' arguments, then the improved on-the-ground policing environment would deter actual corruption, which in turn would reduce referrals and eventual convictions. 26
If state polarization increases, holding all else equal (in particular corruption levels) constant, the logic of strategic prosecution might suggest that incumbent Presidents (or more accurately o cials who have been appointed by incumbent Presidents) may be increasingly motivated to prosecute political opponents as they become more ideologically distinct, and conversely increasingly reluctant to prosecute co-partisans. Hence with the fairly demanding caveat of holding the decision to commit a corrupt act constant, polarization can increase the detection and conviction of the opponents' corruption while decreasing the conviction of allies' corruption.
On the other hand if polarization serves to increase the costs of engaging in corruption, as argued above, then corruption in volume terms will fall. Case referrals will also fall and the US Attorney's o ce will rationally allocate fewer resources to states that are politically polarized.
Column (1) of Table 6 augments Alt and Lassen's first stage estimation results with our main polarization measure, P OL. The dependent variable is the number of 25 As pointed out by Eisenstein (1978) . 26 Alt and Lassen (2014) provide a full discussion of these mechanisms.
Assistant US Attorneys per million population assigned per state per year, and these prosecutorial resources are negatively correlated with state polarization. This finding is consistent both with a deterrence based argument -essentially that accountability increases with polarization, or strategic prosecution -if local polarization acts as a deterrent to prosecute. In the latter mechanism it seems likely, as suggested above, that polarization might act di erently depending on whether the state is aligned or not with the President. Polarization might increase prosecution of the opposition, and it might deter prosecution of politicians aligned with the President.
To investigate this columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 divide the sample depending on whether the State Governor represents the same party as the President. As can be seen there the di erence between the coe cient estimates for polarization in the two subsamples is statistically negligible.
The results relating to prosecution e ort are complementary to those discussed above for corruption levels. Prosecution e ort falls with polarization -a rational response to lower corruption levels. Indeed if prosecution e ort were to fall substantially for strategic reasons, then corruption would (rationally) increase whilst convictions would fall. At some level strategic prosecution will serve to subvert the convictions data as a good measure of corruption. Moreover the symmetric estimated relationship between states with aligned and non-aligned governors is suggestive that strategic explanations do not account for the negative relationship. ***Insert Table 6***
Case Quality
We also examine how the quality of the cases prosecuted change with political polarization. Gordon (2009) hypothesizes that the prosecutor's relative enthusiasm for pursuing cases against political opponents will lead her to prosecute weaker cases than she would against her allies. Following similar reasoning, polarization might plausibly magnify the prosecutor's bias such that increasingly weak cases are filed against opposition defendants and perhaps symmetrically increasingly stronger cases against co-partisans. This yields the following testable extension of Gordon (2009): In more polarized states, sentences are weaker for political opponents and stronger for co-partisans.
Again this sort of strategic prosecution argument contrasts (though not mutually exclusively) with the theoretical arguments of this paper. Above we make the case that the greater accountability raises the expected costs of engaging in corruption. The consequence of this is that marginal low-level corruption is especially reduced. Hence polarization will raise case quality (along with reduce corruption in volume terms). The distinction between the strategic prosecution argument and the accountability argument is that the latter predicts symmetric e ects for opponents and co-partisans.
Gordon (2009) Hence the majority of case are for non-a liated defendants. Regarding the sentences, 130 defendants were sentenced to prison under Bush and 157 under Clinton.
The length of incarceration varies substantially with the maximum of 488 months reached under Clinton. To test the hypothesis that case-quality varies with polarization, and that this relationship changes with partisan alignment we investigate three di erent case-quality measures: (1) the probability of imprisonment, (2) the length of incarceration for those sentenced to imprisonment and (3) the length of punishment considering both incarceration and probation, under the assumption that the most severe probationary sentence (60 months) is more lenient than the least severe incarcerate sentence (one month) following Gordon (2009) . ***Insert Table 7*** Table 7 presents regression results separately for defendants who are aligned with the President (columns 1-3), defendants who are aligned with the opposition (columns 4-6) and non-a liated defendants (columns 7-9). Note first that case quality (as measured by the three dependent variables) is positively related with polarization in all 9 cases. However there is an interesting asymmetry across the subsamples.
There is a very close correspondence between the results for the aligned defendants and the non-a liated defendants. The coe cient estimates are not statistically different from each other for all three case quality measures. This is suggestive that strategic considerations are not a ecting the relationship between case quality and polarization in the instance of aligned politicians. Moreover the estimated positive e ect is consistent with the auxiliary hypothesis advanced above -that greater accountability will reduce total corruption, and in doing so raise the average severity of remaining corrupt activity.
However the relationship is statistically weaker in the case of opposition defendants. One possible interpretation here is that strategic prosecution is in this instance o setting the accountability argument. The former mechanism will lead to a negative relationship between case quality and polarization as partisan bias is amplified and increasingly weak cases get prosecuted. The latter mechanism supports a positive relationship as polarization acts to especially limit low-level corruption.
Polarization and Accountability
The Role of the Media
Polarization induces politicians to increase scrutiny of each other's actions. In principle the media performs a similar role. 27 For example the media may be characterized as akin to opposition politicians insofar that both may 'blow the whistle' on corruption, hence a strong media is a substitute for an active opposition. The presence of a whistle-blowing media may therefore substitute for, and hence dampen the potency of polarization on observed corruption. To investigate this we first use data from
Campante and Do (2014) (2) augments this specification to include state-level political coverage, first separately (column 2) and then jointly with polarization (column 3). In both instances media political coverage has the expected negative coe cient. ***Insert Table 8***
We then test the hypothesis that polarization will be e ective at low levels of media coverage, but relatively ine ective at high levels of media coverage. In order to investigate this an interaction term is included in column (4). The coe cient on the interaction is positive and significant at 10%. This suggests that the e ect of polarization is indeed mitigated by the presence of a stronger media coverage.
Note that Rhode Island is an outlier in the media coverage variable, as noted by Campante and Do, hence column (5) A heterogenous e ect is also found using the panel data. In the absence of time- that the e ect of the media is strongest when polarization is low. Evidence of this heterogeneous e ect is in support of the mechanism investigated in this paper: polarization sharpens the extent to which politicians hold each other to account. If the media provide an alternative way of monitoring corruption, this accountability mechanism is dampened.
Polarization and Corruption Legislation
There are tangible policies that can be implemented to reduce corruption. In particular in recent decades many states introduced ethics commissions to monitor state politicians, whose investigations often lead to Federal and state public corruption prosecutions. This subsection examines evidence that polarization led to states adopting ethics laws and increasing their stringency, thus potentially decreasing corruption.
Rosenson ( existence of a basic ethics code (0, 1); 2. limits on honoraria (0, 1 or 2); 3. limits on gifts from lobbyists (0, 1, 1.5 or 2); 4. post-government employment restrictions (0, 1 or 2); 5. limits on representation of clients before state agencies (0, 1 or 2); 6. mandatory personal financial disclosure (0, 1, 1.5 or 2). For categories 2-6, they receive 1 point if state enacts a law on this specific issue (e.g. state requires disclosure of gifts) and 1.5 or 2 points depending on the stringency of the law (e.g. 1.5 points if state has a numerical limit on gifts and 2 points if state a has a law banning legislators from taking "anything of value" from lobbyists or legislative agents). To investigate whether at least a part of the impact of polarization on corruption is channelled by the monitoring e ect of ethics laws, this ethics law index is included as an additional explanatory variable in the regression analysis. Table 9 contains the result where column (1) duplicates the baseline specification for corruption (column (5) Table 2 ). In column (2) ethics laws turn out to have the expected negative relationship with corruption convictions. This finding is novel in itself. Indeed, Crider and Milyo (2013) , the only paper studying this question, found no e ect of ethics commissions on government corruption convictions for the period 1986-2011. Our analysis di ers from them in that it uses both the adoption and the stringency of ethics laws instead of a mere dummy for the adoption of an ethics commission. Interestingly, including this variable slightly reduces the magnitude of the e ect of polarization on corruption, thus suggesting that some part of the e ect of polarization is channeled by ethics laws.
***Insert Tables 9 and 10 *** Table 10 contains estimation results investigating the hypothesis that state legislature polarization leads state legislators to increase self-monitoring by enacting ethics laws. Column (1) regresses the ethics laws index on polarization along with year and state fixed e ects but without controls, for the period 1960-2002, for which both polarization and ethics laws data are available. Polarization has a statistically significant and positive e ect on the stringency of ethics laws. The e ect is robust to including the political controls used in Besley et al (2010) available for this observation period (column 2), which are found to be important determinants of Ethics laws in Rosenson (2003) . Certain ethics laws were adopted by initiative (Arkansas 1990 , California 1974 , Florida 1976 , Michigan 1975 and Montana 1995 and bypassed legislators. Thus column (3) includes a dummy coded 1 for the yearstate corresponding to an adoption by initiative, which we constructed based on the information Rosenson (2000) . This variable has an expectedly positive impact on Ethics laws but does not a ect the impact of polarization (p-value of .051).
As an alternative illustration of how polarization may lead legislators to reinforce self-monitoring, we look at the type of commissions adopted for the legislative redistricting process. Redistricting has become synonymous with gerrymandering, which in turn is widely held to be a soft form of corruption. 32 Confer (2003) 
Conclusion
By several di erent metrics polarization has been increasing in the US, and in many other countries around the world. Undoubtedly this trend is a cause for concern for many reasons already noted in the literature and beyond. In mitigation, following
Brown ( a corrupt act, then less corruption will be committed, and in particular low-level corruption might be especially deterred. In response federal authorities invest less resources and case quality increases. In the case of prosecutorial resources we also find symmetry across subsamples where the State Governor is aligned and opposed to the President, which speaks in favor of the accountability thesis as opposed to a strategic response to polarization. Similarly for case-quality we find symmetry across subsamples of aligned and non-politically a liated defendants. This evidence again is suggestive that it is not (just) strategic prosecution that explains the findings.
A further finding is that the strength of the empirical relationship between corruption and polarization depends on the strength of local state media. When the latter is measured as weak then the empirical relationship between corruption and polarization is especially pronounced. This suggests that party polarization and the media work as substitutable accountability mechanisms.
Finally, and again in support of the accountability thesis, we find that polarization is associated with tangible anti-corruption legislation. The existence and strength of state ethics laws and also the existence of independent commissions for political redistricting are all positively related with polarization. Table 2 . Corruption and Polarization. Panel 1976-2004 Notes: Dependent variable: Federal corruption convictions per million population in t in every column except in column (5) and 3-year moving average in column (5). Independent variables measured in t-5. Regressions include state and year fixed effects and a set of unreported controls used in Alt and Lassen (2014) , including relative government wages, wages inequality, divided government, real per capita income, real per capita government revenues, percent of high school graduates, log of population, binding one-term limit, binding two-term limit, unemployment, citizen ideology, percent living in urban areas, an interaction term between urbanization and share of democrats in state senate. Column (6) includes additional controls: the share of Democrats in the lower house, the share of Democrats in the upper house, political competition based on data from Besley and Case (2003) , and dummy for a governor not reeligible (lameduck). Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Alt and Lassen (2014) . Column (4) also includes the state Democrat ideology (lagged by 5 years) and column (5) also includes the neighboring states' corruption conviction ratio (weighted by the states population). IV is estimated by two-stageleast squares. The upper part of the Table 7 . Cases quality and Polarization -1998 Polarization - -2004 Notes: The sample extracted from Gordon (2009) is composed of the defendants under Clinton administration (1998) (1999) (2000) and Bush administration (2004 Bush administration ( -2006 , who are politically aligned with the President in columns 1 to 3, aligned with the opposition in columns 4 to 6 and with no identifiable political affiliation in columns 7 to 9. Dependent variables: Prison = Incarceration; Length = Months of incarceration placing zero value on probation; Punish. = Sentences are calculated as 0.2 times the number of months of probation in the sentence if the sentence is solely probationary, and 12 plus the number of months of incarceration plus 0.2 times the number of months of probation if the sentence includes imprisonment (see Gordon (2009) (6) includes state and year fixed effects and a set of unreported controls as described in Table 2 Notes: Dependent variable: yearly score of stringency of state's ethics laws based on 6 categories of legislative ethics restrictions (Basic ethics code, honoraria limit, Gift limit, postgovernment employment limit, Representation limit, Personal financial disclosure) from Rosenson (2000) . Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Column (2) and (3) also include a set of unreported political controls used in Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) , including a measure of political competition, a dummy for whether the Governor is democrat, the average Democratic vote share, a dummy for whether the Democrats control state house and senate, a dummy for whether Republicans control state house and senate, as well as a dummy if the legislative ethics commission is adopted by initiative in column (3). Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
